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The prime cause of all this waste is that Russian business competes on the
basis of political connections rather than costs, quality and price. The distortions
embedded in the system---tax breaks, access to cheap land or energy and freedom
from bureaucratic harassment---mean that, though competition is often intense, the
least productive companies can come out winners. Moscow correspondent for
The Economist, October 23, 1999
Introduction
To the opening quote I can add the following recent quote from the Financial Times of
London "Shell Brasil, the Brazilian subsidiary of the Anglo-Dutch oil group, is to sell 285
service stations and six fuel deposits to Agip do Brasil, the local subsidiary of Eni, the Italian
group. Shell said the move was part of efforts to concentrate on the most profitable parts
of its business in Brazil, but it is understood to have sold the stations, in remote central and
western regions of the country, after failing to compete with smaller distributors undercutting
bigger companies by evading taxes." Shell Brasil would not have left the retailing business in
remote parts of Brasil had it been as able and willing to evade taxes as its smaller competitors.
Examples of Shell’s plight abound. Officials from the Quebec ministry of finance explained
to me that large hotels in the province were in a turmoil because bed-and-breakfast inns were
dodging taxes and undercutting the major chains. A 1996 publication of the Quebec Ministry
of Finance explains that "Businesses that pay their taxes in full are also seriously affected
by unreported work and tax evasion. They face unfair competition on the part of businesses
that offer goods and services at lower prices because these businesses did not pay or collect
income tax or other taxes or they do not comply with the regulations in force (page 24)."
Snippets of concern from the media and government about the uneven enforcement of
taxes are common. Few I have spoken to in government have raised an eyebrow in disbelief
at the suggestion that uneven enforcement of taxes creates an uneven playing field on which
inefficient producers with a willingness and ability to evade taxes oust honest, efficient
producers from the market. The difference between the costs of the surviving evaders and
what costs would have been without evasion is the "displacement loss" from tax evasion. I
put the term displacement loss in quotation marks because it is a term new to economics.3
Public finance theorists are aware that taxes and subsidies can allow some firms to displace
others from the market, but, with the exception of Usher (1975, 1983) few seem to have been
interested in the welfare implications of such displacement. Vito Tanzi (1982, p.88) is among
those few economists to have noticed that "untaxed underground activities will compete with
taxed, legal ones and will succeed in attracting resources even though these activities may
be less productive...There will of course be significant welfare losses associated with this
transfer." Jonathan Kesselman (1997, p.300) made a related point: "If pure tax evasion is
concentrated in particular industries or sectors it will raise net returns from activities in those
sectors, and this will in turn tend to expand those sectors and their products as against
the efficient pattern arising with uniform compliance." Those seeking further enlightenment
about displacement losses will search in vain. Public finance thinkers are like the figure
in a Greek tragedy who is the last to learn that his world is not as he thought it. While
the public finance industry whirrs through theorems on optimal taxation and market failure,
excise officials worry about fairness in the tax system and grope for a formal display that
fairness is efficient. This is the theme of the present paper.
I examine the circumstances under which a displacement loss from uneven enforcement
of taxes arises. The amount of loss depends on how closely tied are a firm’s productive
efficiency and evasive ability. If efficient producers are honest tax payers and inefficient
producers are dishonest, then a rise in taxes creates a climate that favors the survival of
tax evaders above the survival of firms with low production costs. The less related are
productive efficiency and honesty, the lower is this cost. When productive efficiency and
honesty go hand-in-hand, displacement losses tend to be high. Using a simple model of profit
maximizing firms I show how displacement losses from a tax tend to rise as the correlation
between honesty and efficiency rises. My model hints that under very general assumptions
about demand and supply, displacement loss may come to as much as 10% of the value of
an industry’s output. Such a figure rivals the traditional Harberger triangle loss.
I find these results using a simple economic model which I pass through numerical
simulations under a wide variety of parameter values. I say "simple" but it has taken me
several years (Palda 1998, Palda 2000a, Palda 2000b, Palda 2001) to work out how to solve for
equilibrium and how to calculate deadweight displacement losses in the presence of producers
endowed with productive and evasive abilities. This paper can be seen as the culmination of4
the theoretical phase of the research program I cite above. The tools I use here allow me to
answer questions whose answers I was only able to speculate upon in earlier work. In that
earlier work I assumed that evasive and productive talents were uniformly distributed and
uncorrelated. This assumption allowed for clean analytical solutions but did not allow me
to investigate how displacement loss would change with the correlation between productive
and evasive talents. In the present paper I have forsaken analytical solutions by modeling
a joint normal distribution between evasive and productive talents. This sacrifice forces me
to rely on numerical methods of approximation but the sacrifice allows me examine how
displacement loss varies over a broad range of correlations between evasive and productive
talent.
As Judd (1998) points out, one of the advantages of using numerical methods to examine
the implications of a model is that unexpected results may fall out of the simulations. The
most surprising result of the present paper is that if firms with low production costs are bad
at evading taxes, and firms with high production costs are good at evading taxes, government
may make more revenue from a proportional tax than if no one evaded. A positive relation
between productivity and honesty converts a proportional tax into a progressive tax based
on ability to pay. Without any knowledge of firm costs, government can act as a price
discriminating monopolist. Firms who are not good at keeping production costs low may
be able or willing to take the risk of evading part of the tax. Their evasion allows them
to survive and pay taxes. Partial participation in the underground economy keeps money
flowing into government coffers by boosting the survival rates of firms that would collapse
under complete enforcement of taxes. This is how tax evasion may broaden a government’s
tax base beyond what it would be without evasion.
The plan of the paper is first to present a model of firm survival under the rigid assumption
that firms produce a fixed amount or produce nothing at all. Firm efficiency and honesty are
drawn from a joint normal distribution. The simulation results all focus on the consequences
of changing the correlation between efficiency and honesty. The second part of the paper
assumes that firms can vary their output decisions. The results of the first section do not
change under this more general assumption about firm behavior. Unequal enforcement of
tax laws tilt the playing field in favor of those best able to avoid the laws, and this may give
rise to a displacement deadweight loss. Fairness, defined as even enforcement of the law, is5
efficient.
1. Costs under fixed firm output
1.1 No tax evasion
To emphasize that tax evasion can allow good evaders to displace inefficient evaders from
the market I start with a model of an industry in which firms are atomistic and produce each
an identical and fixed quantity of output. I follow Telser (1978) in working first with the
extensive margin, as a step towards understanding more complex cost structures in which
firms can vary their outputs in response to changes in market parameters. Displacement
deadweight loss is most easily understood by focusing on the extensive margin but in Section
3 I allow firms to vary their outputs. As the intensive margin comes into play it amplifies
the displacement losses I study here, but the Section 3 adds only insights for modeling.
In the extensive margin model, potential producers are infinite in number, and indexed
by A. A is a productivity parameter that differs from firm to firm. Nature grants each firm
its A by drawing from a truncated normal distribution f(A) along the interval [0 ,1] with
mean µA and standard deviation σA. Implicitly I assign the set of producers a measure of
one, though I could have assigned them an explicit weight of say N.
To keep notation simple I avoid making the measure explicit and assume that firms that
finds it profitable to produce are constrained to producing the identical infinitesimal output
dq and that the sum of these outputs cannot exceed one. The costs a firm perceives depend
on its particular efficiency index A and taxes T in the following manner: (1+ T)dq/A. Costs,
as perceived by the firm, fall as productivity rises and rise with taxes.
The above cost function may be arrived at by assuming a Cobb-Douglas technology which
makes a firm’s output q a function of its labor L and capital K inputs as well as productivity
parameters A, α, β and that government levies a tax of T on each unit of labor or capital




I assume firms share the same α and β but differ in the parameter A. Firms pay w for a unit
of labor and r for a unit of capital. The costs the firm perceives of hiring labor are w(1+ T)6
and its costs of capital are r(1 + T). If we set α = β = .5 (i.e. constant returns to scale) and





If we assume each firm which decides to produce is constrained to producing an infinitesimal
quantity dq then the above becomes the cost function mentioned earlier. I assume that firms
either produce or do not produce depending on whether their costs are lower than price,
and that all are restricted to producing the same amount so that I may be certain that the
results on industry cost falling out of simulations emerge, as taxes change, from some firms
taking the place of other firms. The cost structure I examine in the present section can be
considered a special case of the cost function I will examine Section 3. In the Cobb-Douglas
world without capacity constraints of Section 3, everyone produces, and displacement takes
place at the intensive rather than the extensive margin. In both cost-structures emerges the
stark result that taxes may increase the average production cost of an industry and lead to
displacement deadweight losses. I have also chosen to model two cost structures because
each calls for modeling techniques that I believe span most of the problems a researcher
would encounter in studying displacement losses from taxation.
A firm’s decision to produce depends on whether its costs (1 + T)/A are less than the
market price P which is paid in terms a numeraire (produced in some other industry without














Equation (4) traces a logistic shaped supply function with a maximum output of 1 attained
as P tends to infinity and sweeps even the highest cost firms (those with very low A) into
the market. Figure 1 illustrates the simple logic of the supply curve. I assume a linear
demand curve of the form Qd = a + bP where a>0 and b<0. Despite the simple layout,
there is no analytical solution to equilibrium owing to the indeterminacy of the integral of
the normal distribution and due to the fact that price P appears in the limits of integration.
Finding an equilibrium in this case calls for numerical methods which search over a broad7
range of possible prices to see which price equates supply and demand. To narrow the
range of possible equilibrium prices searched I have used the bisection method described by
Judd (1998) and also to be found in Burden and Faires (1995). Details of the algorithm are
available in Maple V format from the author upon email request. To ensure the area under
the normal curve comes to unity I have renormalized the truncated normal between zero and
one using the procedure Maddala (1983) prescribes for truncated normal distributions. Figure
2 shows one particular combination of supply and demand curves (for the case where T =2 ,
µA = .5,σA = .1).
As taxes rise, average firm production costs should fall. This is the standard public finance
result. In a high tax environment only firms with the lowest costs will remain standing.
To see this more formally recall that a firm’s production costs depends on its productivity
parameter A as follows: 1/A. This differs from total costs (1 + T)/A as perceived by the








Simulations (not shown here) and which assume demand parameters ranging from completely
inelastic to completely elastic, and µA = .5,σ A = .1, show the expected result that as taxes
rise, the average industry costs (total production costs divided by total output, equation 5
divided by equation 4) fall.
1.2 Tax evasion
The thesis of this paper is that some firms who are less able or willing to evade taxes
than others will find themselves pushed out of the market by less efficient producers with a
greater zest for tax evasion. We can allow for the possibility of evasion by assuming that
nature endows each firm with a particular propensity to pay a proportion i of its taxes. In
this case, a firm perceives its costs to be (1+ iT)/A. A high i signifies the firm pays most of
its taxes. The variable i is the subject of a subfield of public finance on tax evasion begun
by Allingham and Sandmo (1972). Researchers in this field ask how preference parameters
for risk, distribution functions of the risk of apprehension, and the structure of fines interplay
to give a level of tax evasion. I do not look into these details but rather treat the field
as a black box from which emerges the prediction that some people will evade more than8
others. I summarize the field with the parameter i which I refer to as evasive ability. The
lower is i the greater is a firm’s evasive ability, and the more it evades taxes. The decision
to evade and how much to evade could be inserted into my analysis by giving each firm
a utility function which defines its aversion to risk, and some evasion production function,
which makes explicit the ease with which a firm can evade taxes. What would emerge from
such an analysis is that i becomes a complicated function of the parameters underlying the
utility functions of firms as well as their evasion production functions. I have decided not
to introduce such a level of complexity into the present paper so as not to distract from the
paper’s central point that tax evasion creates a displacement deadweight loss. Throughout the
paper I refer to i as evasive "ability" but it could also be thought of as a propensity to evade
derived from the interplay of preference parameters and parameters of an evasion production
function.
Introducing tax evasion through i means that now each firm differs from the other not only
in its endowment of productivity parameter A but also in its propensity to pay taxes i. The
manner in which nature hands out A and i to each firm determines how much displacement
loss there is in the economy. There is no displacement loss if A and i are perfectly negatively
correlated. In such a case the most efficient producers are also the most effective tax evaders.
In Palda (1998, 2001) I showed that if A and i are perfectly positively correlated, high taxes
may invert the order of producers on the supply curves to that the least efficient producers are
those with the lowest overall costs and the most efficient producers are those with the highest
overall costs. In such a case displacement loss becomes extreme. In Palda (1998, 2001) I
also modeled the intermediate case where evasive and productive abilities are uncorellated
and uniformly distributed. The purpose of those assumptions was to derive closed form
solutions for displacement loss and to show that even when evasive and productive abilities
are uncorellated, displacement loss may be significant. My earlier models did not allow me
to examine how displacement loss varies with the correlation between productive and evasive
abilities. I want to examine the effect of correlation between A and i on displacement in
order to establish whether displacement always rises as good producers become bad evaders,
and whether displacement exists even when good producers tend to be good evaders as well.
In previous work I was only able to guess at these answers. The present work gives me a
framework in which to answer these questions.9
We can model the notion that each firm has its own particular productivity and evasive
ability by assuming that each firm draws its productivity A and its evasive ability i from
a truncated joint normal distribution. Both A and i range between zero and one. Their
correlation coefficient is ρA,i. The marginal distributions of A and i have means and standard





























The truncated normal equation I use throughout the paper f(A,i), takes into account that A








I could have chosen other distributions than the bivariate normal. Using methods described
in McFadden (1971) one may take two independently, uniformly distributed random variables
and by arbitrarily restricting their range construct a joint distribution with some non-zero
correlation between the two. The problem with taking McFadden’s approach is that every
time one wants to produce a new correlation coefficient the functional form of the joint
distribution between A and i must change. The bivariate normal does not create this problem,
but has the shortcoming that it does not allow us to derive a closed-form solution for supply
and displacement. The use of the bivariate normal is ad hoc in that I provide no theoretical
micro-basis for why productive and evasive abilities should be tied together through such
a distribution. My use of the bivariate normal may can draw some support from the vast
literature on IQ and talent distribution which argues that talents are approximately normally
distributed. The bivariate beta distribution has a similar shape to that of the bivariate normal
and by judiciously restricting its parameters can afford a closed form solution to supply. I
did not use the bivariate beta distribution because the correlation coefficient between evasive
and productive talents cannot be made to appear explicitly in the distribution function. One
can only vary the correlation coefficient by guessing at variations in the parameters of the
beta distribution that, combined, will give the desired correlation. This means that for the
thousands of different levels of correlation which I pass through my simulations I would10
have to work out thousands of parameter values of the bivariate beta which give the desired
correlation. As the purpose of this paper is to explore in detail how displacement loss varies
with the correlation between A and i I chose the normal distribution in part for modeling
convenience.
Supply falls out of an infinite number of firms, each asking itself whether the sum of its
tax and production cost (1+ iT)/A is below the market price P. The sum of answers to these






The term in curly brackets beneath the double integrals is the area of integration which
captures the criterion each firm uses in deciding whether to produce. The precise bounds of
integration can be gleaned from Figure 3. If (1+ T)/P ≥ 1 then firms with the combinations
of productivity parameter A and evasion parameter i in the shaded area 1, are those firms
who produce. If (1 + T)/P ≤ 1, firms in the area 1 and 2 produce. Integrating the density
function f(A,i) over the appropriate bound gives the weight of firms producing. How supply
is determined can also be seen in Figure 4, the three dimensional analogue in the case of
tax evasion of Figure 1. Those firms north of the "wall" described by (1 + iT)/A decide to
produce. How many of these firms there are depends on how much of the density function
falls on this north side of the wall. The density function I have graphed has ρA,i = .9, which
means that there is a strong tendency for firms with high productivity to pay most of their
taxes. I have set the means of both A and i to be 0.5 and their standard deviations to be



















Figure 5 shows the industry supply function for a range of prices and taxes in the cases
where ρA,i =( −0.9,0.0,0.9). The supply curves have the familiar logistic shape, and tend to
one as price rises and zero as tax rises, holding all else constant. It is only at higher tax
levels that a difference emerges between the three supply curves. At around T = 5 the curve11
with the highest supply is the one generate by ρA,i =0 .9 the lowest supply curve is the one
with ρA,i = −0.9. This is the first hint of a result to emerge when we look at tax revenues.
A positive correlation between productive ability and honesty (or similarly, ineptitude in
evading) transforms a tax rate which officially is the same for all, into a tax based on ability
to pay. Some weak firms are able to hang on at higher tax rates that would not have been
able to hang on at these rates under a lower correlation between A and i.
How do average (also the same as unit), industry production costs vary with the tax? In
the case of no evasion, unit costs unambiguously fell with the tax. The same might not hold
true in the presence of tax evasion if rising taxes allow firms skilled at evasion but unskilled
at production to oust from the market firms with great productive skills but poor evasive
skills. Intuition suggests that when A and i are positively correlated (high productivity
accompanies high tax-paying) average cost may rise with the tax level. A firm’s production
costs are 1/A (recall that the costs a firm perceives (1 + iT)/A differ from its actual costs
of production 1/A). Total industry costs are the sum of individual firm production costs.
Figure 1 indicates that total industry costs in the case of tax evasion again come in two parts.























Unit costs are the above industry production costs divided by total industry output as given
by equations (9) and (10).
We now have all the structure we need to see whether average costs rise with the tax
and whether the rise is larger for higher levels of ρA,i. Figure 6 shows equilibrium average
industry costs for a range of taxes and correlations. To generate this graph my computer
program took a value of T and ρA,i. This nailed down some of the parameters in the supply
function (the other parameters I set everywhere to σi = σA = .1,µ i = µA = .5). The program
then searched for that price which would equalize supply and demand. I then took this
equilibrium price and plugged it into the cost equations 9 and 10. This gave me industry costs.
To get average industry costs at a particular ( T, ρA,i) combination I plugged equilibrium
price into the supply function (equations 9 and 10) and divided total industry costs by total12
industry output. One repeats this process for a wide range of taxes and correlations between
productive and evasive abilities.
To isolate the production side I want to minimize interaction between the demand and
supply curves. To do so I make demand infinitely inelastic. Equilibrium output is fixed
at Q∗
fixed. As supply parameters vary, equilibrium price varies. Output stays the same, but
the identity of the producers changes. If my notions about displacement are correct then as
taxes rise, higher cost producers displace lower cost producers when good evaders tend to be
inefficient producers ( ρA,i > 0). In Figure 6 I have set fixed demand at Q∗
fixed = .5 (recall
that maximum supply is one). Figure 6 shows that for positive levels of correlation between
A and i (inefficient producers are good evaders) average industry costs rise with taxes; the
central result of this paper.
Figure 6 shows that when efficiency and evasive ability are uncorrelated, costs can still rise
with taxes. This result may strike one as odd. If production costs bear no systematic relation
to evasive ability, should not evasive ability simply be a "noise" through which emerges
the well-accustomed opposite flux between taxes and average industry costs? In my earlier
work (Palda 1998, 2000a, 2000b, 2001) I uncovered that average costs may rise with the
burdens government imposes when evasive ability and productive efficiency are independently
and uniformly distributed. In Palda (1998) I explained that "even in such a world, some
firms with poor productive ability but a verve for tax evasion will manage to survive and
displace more productive, but less wily rivals (p.1136)." In that paper I was unable to explore
whether the standard result that taxes drive down average industry costs arose the instant the
correlation between A and i passed from zero, to less than zero because the assumption of
a uniform distribution does not lend itself easily to the construction of different correlations
between A and i. The structure of the present paper allows me to vary this correlation with
ease. Remarkably, even as we move into an industry where ρA,i < 0, average industry costs
continue to rise with the tax. It seems that even when good producers tend to be good tax
evaders, some poor producers will be even better tax evaders and will displace from the
market some more efficient competitors. What accords nicely with intuition in Figure 6 is
that as ρA,i falls, so does the average industry cost. What does not accord with intuition is
that for very low values of correlation average costs fall with correlation. The reason for this
switch is that past a certain point the cost-raising effects of displacement, due to increasing13
correlation between A and i are overcome by the non-linear depressing influence on costs of
a rising A. To see this, note from equation (8) and its graph in Figure 7, that the costs a firm
perceives fall non-linearly with A but fall linearly with i. Correlation is a measure of linear
association between A and i so that a rise in correlation will tend to increase linearly the
group of low-productivity, high-evasion firms who push high-productivity, low-evasion firms
out of the market. As correlation rises, high productivity firms and low productivity firms
receive increasing weight in aggregate supply. Because A depresses costs in a non-linear
fashion, the added linear weight to the high productivity firms who remain in the market
begins to outweigh the cost- increasing influence of the displacement of high-productivity
firms by low productivity firms. Readers familiar with numerical modeling will forgive this
tedious description of the effect of correlation on unit costs by recognizing that pretty graphs
seldom reveal all secrets about a complex model.
Displacement loss is the difference between actual costs and minimum possible costs. I
calculate the minimum possible costs of producing an output Q∗










The right hand side of this equation is the supply curve when no one evades the tax and
when the tax level is zero. The price P ∗
minimum I have solved out for here is the price that
when plugged into the industry cost equation will sweep under the cost integral the most
efficient firms who could produce the amount Q∗
fixed. The price P ∗
minimum can be plugged
into the cost equation when there is no tax evasion to give the minimum cost of producing
the level of output Q∗









We can set the tax level to zero in the above calculations for convenience because when
everyone pays their full tax, there is no displacement loss, so that the cost to the industry of
producing a certain quantity with a tax is the same as producing it without a tax.
The minimum average industry cost of producing an output Q∗
fixed = .5 is 1.7421 units
of the numeraire and does not vary either with tax or correlation between productive and
evasive talents. This makes sense because with fixed output, and no evasion, there is no14
displacement. Only the most efficient firms continue to produce, no matter what the tax
level is. I have represented this minimum cost as the flat plane in Figure 6. At all tax
and correlation levels the evasion unit cost is above the no evasion unit cost of producing
the same quantity. Displacement loss is the difference between the two planes in Figure 6.
Figure 8 graphs displacement as a fraction of the value of industry output and shows that
displacement can range as high as 15% of the value of industry output under the assumptions
of my model.
So far I have kept demand insensitive to price. I did this to isolate the change of the
identity of suppliers due to the displacement effects of a tax. We can go to the opposite
conceptual extreme and make the demand curve infinitely elastic, so that equilibrium price is
a parameter of the demand curve. Figures 9(a)-(c) show how the results previously derived
carry over to this opposite extreme. When good evaders are inefficient producers ( ρA,i > 0),
Figure 9(a) shows that there is a range of prices for which average industry costs rise with the
tax. This result still holds for a zero correlation between A and i but disappears (Figure 9c)
when the correlation becomes negative. Not being able to find a positive relation between
average industry costs and taxes does not mean that displacement deadweight losses disappear
as ρA,i drops below zero. Even when ρA,i < 0 exceptions can be found to the tendency that
efficient firms are good evaders. These exceptions will displace more efficient, less evasively
talented firms and in displacing them force industry costs to be higher than if there were no
displacement. Not finding a positive relation between taxes and average industry costs in
the simulations to which I refer above may simply mean that the displacement loss from a
tax is not prominent enough to show itself in a graph of taxes and average industry costs.
To show the existence of a displacement we need to compare average industry costs under
evasion to the costs of producing an identical output at the minimum possible industry cost,
over a broad range of ρA,i. In simulations not shown here, displacement loss was positive at
all tax and correlation levels.
Finally, we should ask how my results change when the demand curve has a finite
elasticity. In simulations not shown here, the main difference once again is that unit costs
may not rise with the tax, but that displacement loss is ever-present.
2. Laffer curve under fixed firm output15
While experimenting with my numerical model I discovered by chance that maximal
government revenues under tax evasion may be larger than without evasion. Recall that I
assumed a firm pays tax on the value of labor and capital it employs, so that the firm’s tax bill
is wiTL+riTK. With the Cobb-Douglas technology, and the w = r = .5 and α = β = .5i ti s
simple to show that under evasion the revenue a firm with evasive ability i and productive
ability A pays to government is T ×(i/A). The intuition for i is obvious. The less evasively
gifted a firm is (high i) the more tax it pays. Because each firm that decides to produce,
produces the same amount, a more efficient firm (high A) will use less labor and capital
than a less efficient firm and so pay less tax.
Under tax evasion, if (1 + T)/P ≤ 1, then government revenues R can be shown to be








× i × TdAdi (15)
and when (1 + T)/P ≥ 1,









× i × TdAdi (16)








To calculate revenue at any given tax rate T we must calculate equilibrium price P at that
tax and then plug this price into the appropriate bounds of the above integral. This is done
once again by setting the supply equation with no evasion (4) equal to a demand curve
Qd = a+bP and applying a bisection algorithm to solve for the price that equilibrates supply
and demand. In this section I have abandoned the notion of an infinitely elastic demand
curve in order to be able to generate a Laffer (1981) curve with the familiar U-shape. The
parameters values for demand I have chosen are a = 2 and b = −.5.
Figure 10 shows the Laffer curves under evasion and without evasion. Under evasion
and without evasion government revenues at first rise with the tax rate, and then fall. Along
the correlation axis government revenues are constant in the no evasion case, because no
matter what is the correlation between A and i government does not allow i to express
itself. With evasion, government revenues have a varied relation to ρA,i. For low tax rates,16
government revenues rise with ρA,i. As those who are inefficient producers are increasingly
able to evade the tax, the uniform tax rate T becomes a tax according to producer’s ability
to pay. Government grows increasingly able to act as a tax discriminating monopolist.
The revenue generating effects of a high ρA,i may be so great that the maximum possible
government revenue under tax evasion exceeds that without tax evasion. Figure 9 shows that
more government revenue are possible under tax evasion than without it.
A high correlation between productive ability and honesty does not guarantee high tax
revenues. Figure 10 shows that for high tax levels, government receipts fall as ρA,i rises. To
understand this relation suppose an economy is at ρA,i = 1 and T =3 . This is the trough of
the Laffer Curve, where, in spite of the perfect correlation between productivity and honesty,
government revenues are zero. Revenues are low because taxes have pushed consumers
into a very elastic section of the demand curve. Now lower ρA,i. This makes it easier than
before for low cost producers to survive. They pass these savings on through price and bring
consumers back to part of the demand curve Laffer curve that is less elastic. Government
revenues rise.
The superior revenue generating powers of tax evasion under high ρA,i should not be
taken to mean that tax evasion is good for society, nor should any easy prescriptions for
public policy be inferred. Tax evasion carries with it a displacement loss. Research into
optimal taxation must calculate the marginal social cost of public funds for any given ρA,i
and equate this to the marginal benefit of a social welfare function in order to judge where
on the (ρA,i,T) grid government should place itself.
3. Displacement under variable firm output
The results of the previous section were stark. Tax revenue can be higher under tax
evasion than without evasion. Evasion allows some inefficient firms to displace efficient
firms so that as the tax rises, average industry costs rise. How much of these findings
are due to constant cost structure I assumed and due to my assumption that each firm that
decides to produces the same amount as all other firms? In this section I give firms once
again a Cobb-Douglas production function but lift the output constraints I had imposed in
the previous sections of this paper and allow for decreasing returns to scale. I find that17
under a Cobb-Douglas production function with diminishing returns to scale, displacement
deadweight loss gives results that are even more pointed than those of the previous section.
The Cobb-Douglas technology I assume makes a firm’s output q a function of its labor L




As before, firms share the same α and β but differ in the parameter A. Firms pay w for a unit
of labor and r for a unit of capital. Government levies a tax of T on the value of each unit
of capital and labor the firm employs ( T may be thought of as unemployment insurance and
a capital tax) and a firm pays only i percent of this tax, and avoids the rest. My main reason
for studying this particular type of tax is that it considerably simplifies the cost structure of
firms and makes modeling easy. The parameter i is specific to each firm. The costs the
firm perceives of hiring labor are w(1 + iT)L and its costs of capital are r(1 + iT)K. If we





The above is tedious but straightforward to derive from the firm’s cost-minimizing problem
and the interested reader may consult Varian (1984, p. 28) for details. In this section I have
switched to the assumption of increasing costs because unlike in the previous section I no
longer fix each firm’s output to be the same as all other firms’ outputs. To get a determinate
result with many firms I must assume increasing costs.
If the price of the good which the firm produces is P, a firm’s profit maximizing calculations







The above supply function looks like familiar terrain, but a short tour around its landmarks
will help us to make sense of the results that follow on displacement deadweight loss.
Equation (18) says that under diminishing returns to scale a firm with α = .25 and β = .25
increases its output linearly with price. Under these circumstances marginal costs rise at a
constant rate so that the supply curve is positively sloped and linear. If A were to double, a
quick glance at the production function (18) shows that provided α+β<1 labor and capital18
could fall by more than one half and while keeping output constant. Another way of putting
this is that output rises exponentially with the productivity parameter A, as equation (20)
shows. Output falls as the tax T rises, and falls as the fraction of this tax that the firm pays
i rises. Taxes have a non-linear effect on output because I assumed that taxes work their
way through labor and capital inputs. A rise in the tax is like an equal rise in wages and
interest. At the original level of output this would simply raise costs linearly because the
similar change in price of labor and capital does not warrant their recombination in order
to soften the effect of the tax on costs. The linear increase in costs forces the firm to cut
back output. As its output falls the firm sees its production costs fall at an increasing rate
(we are going backwards along a decreasing returns to scale production function). Further
increases in taxes will have less and less effect on firm output as the firm retreats into
the high productivity segment of its production function. This explains why taxes have a
non-linear and diminishing effect on firm output.
There are no complicated bounds of integration to worry about in deriving the industry
supply function under a Cobb-Douglas production function with increasing costs, as there
were in the cost structure I examined in the previous section. Each firm produces something.
If each firm produces, the entire range of productive abilities A, (zero to one), and evasive



















Aggregate supply is linear in price. This was not the case in the previous section where
supply bore an S-shaped relation to price. In the present case all firms produce. Price does
not sweep across a normal distribution of costs. All firms in the distribution are included in
supply from the start. Price works its effects through each individual firm’s supply function
(20) in a linear manner. The sum of linear price effects on firm output shows up in a linear
relation between industry output and price.
Equilibrium price occurs where supply (22) equals demand, which as before we take to














No bisection algorithm is needed here to search for equilibrium price. P appears explicitly
in Qs and not in the bounds of integration as it did in the previous formulation of supply
(equation 8). This allows us to isolate P directly instead of needing to integrate over f(A,i)
(as I was forced to do numerically in Section 1) to isolate P.
A firm’s production costs are not the same as the costs it perceives. The firm perceives
costs of (1+ iT)q2/A2. The resource costs of producing the amount q are q2/A2. Substituting

















The displacement loss from tax T is the above cost of producing equilibrium industry output
when all producers evade to greater or lesser degrees, less what it would cost to produce
this output if no one evaded the tax. In an honest world the industry costs of producing any
given level of output will fall below the costs of producing this output under tax evasion. A













where in the second line I have made use of the fact that firm supply q is (A2P)/2. Summing







We cannot simply subtract the above minimum cost from actual costs as given by (24) to
get the deadweight loss from displacement. We must find that price without evasion (call it
P ∗
honesty) in the above equation that would lead to the same industry output as under evasion
at a particular tax T. Without tax evasion a firm’s output is q = A2P/[2(1+T)]. Setting T =0
simplifies this expression. As explained throughout this paper, whether tax is positive or20
zero makes no difference to the calculation of minimum cost in a world without tax evasion.










The equilibrium price under honesty P ∗
honesty at which equilibrium industry output under
evasion Q∗
evasion is equal to output under honesty Qs
honesty as given by equation (28) comes
from equating Q∗
honesty to Q∗










Substituting this price into industry cost under honesty as given by (27) gives what would
be the least cost way of producing that output which an industry with evaders produces at
tax T. The difference between actual costs as given by equation (24) and minimum costs as
given by equation (27) is the displacement loss from the tax.
Once again I assume demand to be completely inelastic so that I can focus on how
different producers displace each other in conditions where demand forces them to compete
for a fixed pie. I calculate equilibrium price under evasion using equation (23) and plug this
into equation (24) to calculate industry costs. I then divided industry costs by equilibrium
output to get average production costs for the industry. In the previous section I showed how
unit costs could increase with tax. Standard public finance theory says that average industry
production costs fall as taxes increase. In a figure not shown here I found, as in the fixed
output case, average industry costs rise with the tax. The two main differences were that in
the figure not shown here, displacement loss was larger than in the case where firms’ output
was fixed, and that average industry costs fell uniformly as the correlation between A and i
increased.
Nothing in the arguments I have developed insists that unit costs must rise with the tax
for a deadweight loss from displacement to exist. Rising unit costs are an unmistakable sign
of displacement loss, but subtler signs can be found. A displacement loss exists if unit costs
are greater under tax evasion than they would be without tax evasion. We need this insight
when examining cases where the demand curve is not perfectly inelastic. When I set demand
parameters to a = 2 and b = −.5 a graph of unit costs (not show here) no longer shows a21
negative relation between taxes and average industry costs. This does not mean displacement
does not exist.
4. Laffer curves under variable firm output
So far the results of the previous section have carried over to the case of a Cobb- Douglas
production function. What about the finding that tax revenue may be larger with evaders
about than in a world where all pay government its due?
With tax evasion, taxes collected from each firm are wL × iT + rK × iT. If, as before,
w = r = .5, and α = β =0 .25, it is simple to show that labor and capital are employed in
equal quantities L = K =( q/A)2. The taxes a firm pays reduce to ( q/A)2 × iT. Substituting
the complete expression for q as given in equation (20) into revenues gives government




(1 + iT)2 (30)
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In a figure not shown here, what came through again was that in the case where the demand
parameters are a = 2 and b = −.5, tax evasion may allow government to raise more revenue
than if everyone paid their allotted tax. Government revenues under evasion are highest
for very high correlations between A and i. The explanation for this is the same as in the
previous section: when efficient producers are poor evaders, tax evasion turns an equal tax on
all into a tax based on ability to pay. By chance, government benefits from the distribution22
of productive and evasive talents to discriminate between taxpayers and raise revenues to
heights not possible in a world where none cheat.
5. Extensions and testing
Taxes are not the only form of government intervention that produce displacement losses.
As I showed in Palda (2000a), evasion of the minimum wage can force honest, high-
productivity producers who comply with the minimum wage to retreat before dishonest,
inefficient producers who evade the minimum wage. In Palda (2000b) I showed how firms
that are good at lobbying government for favors can oust from the market firms that are
less talented at lobbying but who are more efficient at producing. The notion that a person
may have two talents that help him survive in the market goes back at least to the work of
Roy (see Heckman and Honore 1990) who took up the theme of how the joint distribution
of multiple-talents tugs a man into one occupation instead of to another. The question
of displacement loss never arose in those models because the multiplicity of talents they
considered were productive talents. My model explicitly considers how a productive talent
bundled Januslike with an unproductive talent can make a firm a menace to economic welfare.
Like vultures circling, deadweight losses signal a crippled market. Externalities, adverse
selection, tax wedges between cost and reservation demand price, are the big game of welfare
economics, not just for their economic interest, but also because of their interest to politics.
According to McNeill (1976), Becker (1983), and many others, political systems may evolve
to dampen deadweight losses. This is why deadweight loss is not the exclusive plaything of
the welfare theorist, but also of those who study the formation of government and of other
institutions geared to minimizing waste. Displacement deadweight losses are easy to banish
in circumstances where a firm can separate its productive from its unproductive abilities.
The institution of transferable fishing quotas, and transferable emissions quotas are intended
to allow inefficient firms who win the lottery for the right to produce to transfer their rights
to more efficient firms. Such an institution wipes out displacement losses at the cost of
organizing the markets for the quotas. Societies which do not create the conditions for such
markets to flourish may labor under displacement losses. How do institutions deal with less
easily separable talents such as productive ability and the ability to evade taxes? Perhaps23
complexity crept into tax codes in order that those with an knack for tax evasion could put on
the cloak of accountants, lawyers, and lobbyists and sell their services to the highest bidders.
Those who would bid highest are the most productive, least evasively gifted producers. What
Public Choice economists deride as the "rent-seeking" costs from lobbying may be echoes of
a larger loss from displacement that lobbyists mitigate by helping to separate evasive from
productive abilities.
The insights of my model of displacement may extend to sociology. Most of us have
worked with officemates whom we know to be incompetents, but who have a knack for
bringing their meager accomplishments to the attention of the department head or the shop-
floor supervisor. Viennese psychoanalyst Erich Fromm called this type the "marketing
personality." Social norms that limit boasting may be an attempt to limit the deadweight
losses from the displacement of talented workers by their mundane colleagues afflicted with
the gift of the gab.
Are there any testable implications in my model or is it just another shack in the shantytown
of metaphysics that now sprawls over economics? A prediction of my theory is that we might
find that rising taxes lead to increased industry costs. This is only half the story. Science is
about connecting causes to effects. To do that you need measurement. We may be able to
measure industry costs, but how do we measure evasive talents? If this challenge could be
met, then my theory could be subject to testing. I do not wish to bow my head too low in
humility on this point. No one has ever seen a Harberger triangle, those three-sided sprites
of the welfare-economics forest, but this never stopped the masters of computational general
equilibrium models from practicing their insightful alchemy. Even when they are not directly
testable, numerical simulations tell us what happens over a range of possible parameters.
If my model is not directly testable, then the challenge to making it interesting is to find
out how evasive and productive abilities are related so that we may form some idea of the
parameters of their joint distribution, and calibrate our simulations with these benchmarks.
Progress might come from surveying firms to ask them how much tax they evade and how
they rate their productive efficiency in comparison with that of their competitors.
6. Conclusion24
When a productive talent such as the ability to make a good efficiently combines in a
firm with a talent for tax evasion, low-productivity firms with good evasive abilities may
oust from the market efficient firms with poor evasive abilities. The difference between the
cost of production of those inefficient firms who remain standing in the market and the lower
costs of the efficient firms they ousted is the displacement deadweight loss from tax evasion.
This deadweight loss generally increases with the correlation between efficiency and honesty
in paying taxes. When efficient firms are poor tax evaders, and inefficient firms are good
tax evaders a uniform tax on firm inputs becomes a tax according to ability to pay. This
transformed tax allows the government to act as would a price discriminating monopolist, so
that we may find that government revenues may be greater under tax evasion than without
tax evasion.
My analysis casts a negative light on the underground economy. Tax evasion is "unfair"
in the sense that it allows inefficient producers to push their more efficient more honest rivals
to the fringes of the market. The difference in the costs of the actual producers and those
who would have survived had government enforced taxes evenly is a social loss. Unfairness
is inefficient.
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